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NUCLEAR OBJECTIONS: THE PERSISTENT
OBJECTOR AND THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTRODUCTION
The Charter of the United Nations begins with a stern
charge, inspired by the horrible war which led to its crafting-
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights [and] in the
dignity and worth of the human purpose."' It was this faith
that had been, severely shaken by the pictures emerging from
the German death camps. Thus, the United Nations ("UN")
embarked upon its primary mission in defense of the human
purpose-to safeguard the global community from war by not
only keeping peace, but by making peace as well.2 While the
United Nations has grown in its scope and commitment to
social and economic development, the basic commitment to
peace remains the cornerstone of the organization. This com-
mitment is exemplified by the continued growth of United
Nations peacekeeping missions around the world: Currently
over 26,000 civilian and military personnel are engaged in six-
teen different peacekeeping operations.3 Despite a budgetary
U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
2 This commitment to seek peace is embodied in the concept of "collective
security." Under collective security, a group of states accepts a legal obligation to
move promptly to counter any act of aggression against a member of the commu-
nity. The specific procedure for the implementation of a collective security system
is outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter, entitled "Action with Respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Chapter VII gives
the Security Council the authority to respond to events that threaten international
peace with economic or diplomatic sanctions or, if these measures fail, with mili-
tary force. Further, the chapter binds member states to comply and assist with
actions taken by the Council. However, Article 51 of the Charter was carefully
drafted to state that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations .... " Id. at art. 51.
s The Year in Review 1996: UN Peace Missions (visited May 20, 1997)
<http'J/www.un.orgdeptsfdpko/yir96!peace96.htm>.
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crisis at the United Nations, the demands and complexity of
peacekeeping operations have expanded, and the Secretary-
General has stated that such expansion is necessary to move
the United Nations toward its goal to be a peacemaker.4 That
wars still occur does not mean that the United Nations has
failed in its duty to curtail the use of force in international re-
lations, but rather that the challenge of doing so is a complex
and ever-evolving one. The United Nations itself is but part of
a larger process of international law, and a relative newcomer
in a field of law that has been evolving for well over a thou-
sand years: jus in bello, the law of war.'
In its attempts to regulate the conduct of states and their
use of force, the Charter of the United Nations represents
another step forward in the evolution of jus in bello.6 Such an
evolutionary step must have been prompted not only by the
horrible crimes perpetrated by the Nazis over the course of
World War II, but also by the new weapon which the Allies
had raced to develop to bring an end to the war-the atomic
bomb. This weapon of immense destructive power represented
a revolutionary leap forward in the methods of war, and yet
another challenge for the system of law which arose to govern
the use of force among states. This new threat has engendered
an effort to contain it in many ways similar to past efforts to
control weapons which pose such threat to humanity that their
use, even in war, is unacceptable.7
' BouTRos BOuTROs-GHALI, BUILDING PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 1994: ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION 151-63 (1994). The recent UN
peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina are indicative of the
expanded scope of UN peacekeeping. In Rwanda, UN forces took on the responsi-
bility of supplying and maintaining refugee camps. The United Nations Protection
Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were in place long before the warring factions had
agreed to a peace plan. Id. at 225-28, 250-52.
" The law of war, one of the oldest fields of international law, has engendered
much scholarly work. For a general discussion, see, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW
OF WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., 1925).
6 On the Charter provisions concerning the use of force by states, see general-
ly D.W. BOWETr, SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); HAYS KELSEN,
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957).
7 History marks many attempts to regulate the use of particular means and
methods of warfare, such as the complete banning of the use of chemical and
biological weapons. Similar prohibitions reach to the earliest recorded history of
international law. See infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text; see generally
THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
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A weapon capable of devastating an entire city or country
in a brief time lent a new urgency to the old threat of war.' In
response to this increased threat, the International Court of
Justice ('ICJ) has been asked several times over the past
decades to apply the principles of international law to the
varied threats presented by nuclear weapons.' The latest ap-
pearance of nuclear weapons before the ICJ did not come in
the form of a dispute between states, but rather as a request
from the General Assembly for an advisory opinion-a far
more general statement on the status of international law. The
request itself was no less general, asking the court to rule on
the legality, under any circumstances, of a state's threat to
use, or the actual use of nuclear weapons." On July 8, 1996,
the court answered with a qualified "no," stating that "the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary
' Some scholars hold that during the Cold War, dttente between the super-
powers was actually encouraged through a policy of 'mutually assured destruction":
Neither power would risk confrontation when any such confrontation could poten-
tially escalate to nuclear holocaust. Of course, a system of deterrence based on
mutually assured destruction always carries with it this destruction as the price of
failure. See generally Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May
Be Better, ADELPHI PAPERS, Autumn 1991. But see Lewis Dunn, Nuclear Prolifera-
tion: A Defense In-Depth, in LIMITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 283 (Jed Snyder
ed., 1985). After the Cold War, nuclear proliferation presents the additional threat
of nuclear weapons spreading to already destabilized regions. See Dunn, supra, at
283-99; Victor Gilinsky, Restraining the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Walk on the
Supply Side, in LIhITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra, at 255-75; Jed C.
Snyder & Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Introduction to LIbITING NUcLEAR PROLERATION,
supra, at xvii-xovii.
' The United Nations Charter split the United Nations into six main divisions,
or "principal organs": the Secretariat, the Trusteeship Council, the Security Coun-
cil, the General Assembly ("GA"), the International Court of Justice, and the Eco-
nomic and Social Council ("ECOSOC*). The Secretariat is the administrative body
of the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council was established to supervise the
administration of the trust territories left by the mandates of the League of Na-
tions. The Security Council is entrusted with the primary responsibility for keep-
ing world peace. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN and functions
in accordance with its Statute. The court is empowered to decide, in accordance
with international law, such cases as are submitted to it by states. It may also
choose to grant advisory opinions at the request of the General Assembly or Secu-
rity Council on any legal question and, at the request of other organs of the UN
and specialized agencies, on any legal question within the scope of the organs' or
agencies' activities. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, UNIT-
ED NATIONS HANDBOOK 1-20 (1994).
1 For the text of the request, see infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian
law.11
The "rules of international law applicable in armed con-
flict" may be among the oldest fields of international law. Yet,
the process and formation ofjus in bello derives from the same
sources, and is governed by the same factors, which control the
formation of other aspects of the law of nations. It was these
basic principles of international law that governed the court's
treatment of the Request." This Note, however, is concerned
primarily with the use of one of those sources of law as it may
relate to nuclear weapons: customary international law.
International custom generally can be defined as "law
resulting from a general and consistent practice of
States-opinio juris-with a sense that the practice is required
by law, not merely done as an act of courtesy or grace."13 If
enough states follow a practice for a sufficient time period and,
more importantly, do so out of a sense of legal obligation, that
H Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons at 36, 1996 I.C.J. _
(July 8) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion] (as the opinion had not been published at
press time, hereinafter pinpoint citations will refer to the original draft of the
decision rendered) (on file with author and also available on the Internet at Cor-
nell Law Library, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (last modified
Sept. 1996) <http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/icjl/opinion.htm>). The court followed
this broad statement with a narrow qualification:
[Un the view of the current state of international law, and of the ele-
ments of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitely wheth-
er the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in
an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a
State would be at stake.
Id.
12 Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 36. Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice lists the sources from which international law may
be drawn. They include:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38 [hereinafter ICJ STAT-
UTE].
3 Louis Henkin, General Course on Public International Law, 216 REC. DES
COURS 1, 46 (1989-IV).
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particular practice may assume the status of a rule of interna-
tional law. To require unanimity among states, however, would
condemn the role of custom to mere theory. But attempting to
bind a sovereign state to a rule it finds offensive invites that
state to remove itself from the process of lawmaking entirely,
threatening the very idea of an international community. In re-
sponse to this dilemma, a specialized mechanism of customary
law formation has arisen: the Persistent Objector Rule
("Rule"). 14
In answering the Request, the court did indeed find that
certain rules of customary international law prohibited, or
severely curtailed, the threat or use of nuclear weapons."
Therefore, should the nuclear states be brought before the
court for their continued use of nuclear weapons, or continued
policies constituting a threat to use nuclear weapons, these
states may choose to cast themselves in the role of persistent
objector."6 This Note analyzes the ramifications of such a use
of the Rule, and examines whether the Rule's use should be
permitted under such circumstances. Part I examines the na-
ture of the Request made by the General Assembly, the opin-
ion of the court and the possible place for the persistent objec-
tor in nuclear politics. Part II outlines the history, elements,
and policy goals of the Rule as a tool of international lawmak-
ing. Part Ill seeks to apply the Rule to the circumstance of the
" The Rule attempts to provide a place for the objector within the community
by allowing a state to exempt itself from an emerging custom of international law.
In order to avail itself of the Rule, however, the objector must satisfy two ele-
ments, revealed in the name of the Rule itselfi The objecting state must lodge its
objection to a common practice of states before a rule of custom has formed, and
must object both persistently and consistently so as to put all states adhering to
the forming custom on notice that the objector will not be bound to the practice.
Thus, where the formation of custom might otherwise drive a state from the inter-
national legal system, the Rule not only provides a place for the objector within
the system, but also demands that the objector be an active participant in the
legal process in order to preserve its place as objector. For an in depth discussion
of the nature and elements of the Rule, see infra notes 30-64 and accompanying
text; see also Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer The Principle
of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INTL L.J. 457 (1985).
" See Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 31.
16 The members of the so-called "nuclear club" included, as of 1993, Belarus,
China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Also, while they do not officially admit to possessing nuclear weapons, India, Isra-
el and Pakistan are widely suspected of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. See NATU-
RAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK (Dec. 1993).
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nuclear case, by examining whether the Rule can and should
be applied to the nuclear states in light of the nature of the
customs limiting the use of nuclear weapons and the goals of
the Rule.
The rules of customary law that the court found to limit
the threat or use of nuclear weapons are rooted in principles of
already existing and forming rules of humanitarian and envi-
ronmental law. These principles, in turn, are rules of jus
cogens: rules upon which international relations are based, and
from which no derogation is permitted. This exclusive property
of rules of jus cogens serves to bind even the persistent objec-
tor. Allowing a state to derogate from a fundamental principle
of international law would create an intolerable inequality
among nations, and among their citizens as well, since state
would be acting under, essentially, a different set of fundamen-
tal principles defined by previous objections. Thus, the nuclear
objector, while fitting the definition of the persistent objector,
should be denied any potential benefit from the Rule.
I. THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT
A. The Request and Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons
On December 15, 1994, the United Nations General As-
sembly ("General Assembly") adopted Resolution 49/75K, mak-
ing the following request:
The General Assembly...
Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of
the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice
urgently to render its advisory opinion on the following question:1
"Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances
permitted under international law?"'8
The passage of this resolution was the product of a combined
effort of nonaligned nations19 and nongovernmental organiza-
17 Article 96 grants, in part, the General Assembly and Security Council au-
thority to request of the ICJ an advisory opinion on "any legal question." U.N.
CHARTER art. 96.
1" G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A149/49 (1994) [hereinafter Request].
"' The draft resolution, which was passed as Res. 49f75K, was introduced in
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tions ("NGOs) 2" who shared a growing concern over the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era. The
urgency was compounded by the perception of many non-nucle-
ar states that the nuclear states had failed to live up to their
promises of disarmament included in the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty."
This is not the first time the legality of nuclear weapons
has come into question. As early as 1961, the General Assem-
bly had passed a resolution condemning the weapons. That
resolution reads in part:
The General Assembly,
Believing that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as
nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high
ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established
to achieve...
1. Declares that:
(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary
to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a
direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations [and] ... con-
trary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humani-
ty.n
the First Committee (Disarmament) by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned
Countries. See United States, First Committee, General and Complete Disarma-
ment: Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. GAOR 48th Seas.,
Agenda Item 72, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/48/L.25 (1993).
"0 In January of 1992, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nucle-
ar Arms ("IALANA7), in conjunction with the International Peace Bureau and
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, established the World
Court Project, an effort to lobby countries in support of the submission of a re-
quest for an advisory opinion and an eventual finding of a prohibition against
nuclear weapons. See NICHOLAS GRIEF, THE WORLD COURT PROJECT ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1993).
21 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970)
[hereinafter NPTI. In Article VI of the NPT, state parties pledge to "pursue nego-
tiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ... nuclear disarmament."
Dissatisfaction with the progress made by the nuclear states on this promise was
a major theme marking the NPT renewal talks in 1994. See Douglas Jehl, US. in
New Pledge on Atom Test Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at AS.
2 G-A Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/5100 (1961). This resolution has been reaffirmed twice, once in 1972 by GA
Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doe. Ai8730 (1972),
and again in 1980 by GJAL Res. 35/152D, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at
68, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980). While each of these resolutions passed by a wide
margin, it was over the objections, in most cases, of the nuclear states. Hence,
these resolutions have not had an effect on the nuclear policy of these states.
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Nuclear weapons, however, have only rarely been a topic be-
fore the ICJ, appearing only twice in 1974 in the Nuclear Tests
Cases.' Notably, the ICJ recently refused to reopen consider-
ation of the New Zealand Nuclear Test Case to consider the
resumption of French nuclear testing in islands in the South
Pacific, leaving the current request for an advisory opinion the
first before the court since 1974.24 The willingness of the Gen-
eral Assembly to submit such a request may mark an increase
in concern over the threat presented by nuclear weapons, a
response to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request
that "United Nations organs turn to the court more frequently
for advisory opinions."25
The ICJ responded to the "urgency" cited in the Request
by choosing to reach the merits of the question. The ICJ's pow-
er to grant advisory opinions is discretionary." It is the exer-
However, the court did take note of the fact that these resolutions are proof of
"the desire of a very large section of the international community to take, by a
specific and express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a significant step
forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament .... " Advisory Opinion,
supra note 11, at 27.
2 Both of the 1974 Nuclear Test Cases sprung from French nuclear testing.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.),
1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20). New Zealand and Australia argued that the radioactive
fallout from the French nuclear testing posed an illegal threat to the territory of
both nations. Responding to this argument, the court issued an "interim order of
protection" calling for France to cease testing while the cases were pending. Nucle-
ar Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (June 22). France ignored this order and
refused to recognize the proceedings before the court. However, France ceased
testing before the case could be considered in full and declared that no further
testing would be performed in the region. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J.
457, 478 (Dec. 20). Accordingly, the court found the cases moot, dismissing them
without reaching the merits. See BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 1003 (1980). Notably, the court recently refused to reconsider
the cases in light of the resumption of French testing in the region. See Request
for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.),
1995 I.C.J. 288, 307 (Sept. 22).
2 See Hague Denies Injunction on French Nuclear Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1995, at A4.
23 BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING, AND PEACE-KEEPING 22 (1992).
26 ICJ STATUTE art. 65 reads in pertinent part: "The Court may give an advi-
sory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be autho-
rized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request." See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Advisory Opinion), 1951 I.C.J. 15, 19 (May 28).
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cise of this discretion that was the first point of contention
between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. The court had to
first determine that the Request constituted a "legal," as op-
posed to political, question, and that the General Assembly
was competent to certify such a question to the court.' The
court held that:
The fact that this question also has political aspects ... does not
suffice to deprive it of its character as a "legal question" and to "de-
prive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Stat-
ute. Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit
the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an
essentially judicial task, namely, as assessment of the legality of the
possible conduct of states with regard to the obligations imposed
upon them by international law.'
' Each of the nuclear states submitting written arguments to the court argued
that the court should have used its discretionary power to decline an advisory
opinion an the grounds that the Request did not embody a "legal" question, as is
required by the court for the exercise of discretion. This argument was usually
presented in two parts: First, the nuclear states argued that the Request was too
vague to be analyzed effectively. Since there has not been a threat or use of nu-
clear weapons provoking the current case, there would be an insufficient factual
basis upon which the court could work. See Written Submission of France at 13-15
(as the written submissions had not been published at press time, hereinafter pin-
point citations will refer to the original draft of the statement submitted by each
state) (on file with author); Written Submission of the United Kingdom at 28-29.
Second, it was argued that nuclear weapons were, in fact, a political tool and a
political problem to be solved through the treaty-making process. To give a legal
opinion on nuclear weapons, it was feared, would hinder this process. See Written
Submission of the Federal Republic of Germany at 4-5; Written Submission of the
Russian Federation at 2; Written Submission of the United States at 5-6. See also
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1962 LCJ. 151, 155
(July 20) ("[In accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give an
advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the
Court has no discretion in the matter, it must decline to give the opinion request-
ed. But even if the question is a legal one, which the Court is undoubtedly com-
petent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so.").
"Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 9 (citations omitted). The court also
responded to the more specific arguments of the nuclear states. In response to the
vagueness argument, the court stated: =The purpose of the advisory function is not
to settle-at least directly-disputes between States, but to offer legal advice to
the organs and institutions requesting the opinion. The fact that the question put
to the court does not relate to a specific dispute should consequently not lead the
court to decline to give the opinion requested." Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at
10-11 (citations omitted). In response to the argument that an opinion would hin-
der disarmament negotiations, the court found no convincing evidence that such
damage would occur, and pointed out that an opinion would only be an "additional
element" in the continuing disarmament and arms control process. Sce Advisory
Opinion, supra note 11, at 11.
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Having reached the merits of the question presented to it,
the court found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is
illegal in all but the most extreme circumstance of self-defense.
Moreover, the grounds for this decision lay in the customary
rules of humanitarian law. 9 Thus, the nuclear states are
faced with the possibility of finding not only their arsenals, but
parts of their foreign policy, on the wrong side of international
law.
B. Custom and the Role of the Persistent Objector
The development of international law is often far more
difficult to track than that of domestic common law. Rules of
law are defined by the actions of states, whether by their par-
ticipation in treaties or their adherence to custom. That cus-
toms may develop without a written instrument makes them
no less binding upon states than treaties-once the existence of
a customary rule has been acknowledged. 0 Article 38 of the
Statute of the ICJ acknowledges such unwritten law by recog-
nizing both "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice of law [and] the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations.""1 The former of these sources, a rule of
international customary law, is formed when a significant
group of states follow a certain practice or rule consistently out
29 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30 Waldock compares the systems of international law and domestic common
law, writing:
The great difference between them is that, whereas centuries of judicial
action have crystallized the common law into a body of well-defined prin-
ciples, the judicial process is so recent a phenomena [sic] in international
law and its operation so intermittent that the unwritten element in the
international system is still, much of it, undefined.
Humphery Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 REC. DES
COuRS 1, 38 (1962-I).
31 ICJ STATUTE art. 38. Importantly, international custom, while not formed
through written instruments, does not necessarily remain unwritten. United Na-
tions resolutions, which do not by themselves create rules of law, nonetheless may
be cited as embodiments of already existing custom, provided that the traditional
criteria for the formation of customs are met. In this way, UN resolutions, espe-
cially those passed by a large majority of states, may be cited as evidence of the
opinio juris of states. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 26.
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of a sense of legal obligation.' Custom, then, is a means by
which law may be formed by acclamation of the international
community.
Custom as a source of law in no way provides a bright line
indicator of when a rule may be formed or even the exact
boundaries of the rule itself. Another ambiguity presented by
the use of custom as a source of international law is the status
of a state that stands apart from its fellow states by rejecting a
practice. Custom requires a significant number of states to
participate in a particular practice before such a practice may
be even considered to have achieved the position of customary
rule of law. Yet the requirement of a general and consistent
practice among states in no way demands unanimity among all
members of the international community. A custom may still
be recognized as a rule of international law despite the vocifer-
ous objections, in word and deed, from a particular state.'
But in considering the place of this objector state, the essential
anarchy of the international system must be remembered-no
overarching authority exists for the enforcement of internation-
al law. A sovereign state can be pressured diplomatically, eco-
nomically and even militarily, but its sovereignty remains.
There is no international government or police force which can
compel a state to act, even in accordance with international
rules of law.'
WESTON ET AL., supra note 23, at 77-100.
For an in-depth treatment of the elements of custom, see, e.g., Michael
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 11974-19751 BRIT. Y.B. IN"t'L
L. 1, 24 (1977).
' The anarchy of the international system, the absence of an overarching au-
thority to compel the observance of law, must not be confused with chaos, an
absence of the rule of law altogether. Despite this anarchy states still have a
strong incentive to follow some rule of law, whether that law is expressed in
terms of treaty, custom or the ruling of a court. At the most basic level, the in-
centive toward law springs from the need to avoid and deter war. Historically,
interstate violence has been most infrequent when there exists a strong interna-
tional community subscribing to an accepted body of law. See generally ROBERT J.
ART & ROBERT JERVIS, INTERNATIONAL POLMCS, ANARCHY, FORCE, POLrIMCAL
ECONOMY AND DECISION MAKING (2d ed. 1985). With the end of the Cold War, a
transition from a system of deterrence through balance of power between the su-
perpowers to a system of collective security will require an even greater respect
for the rule of law. See BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 25, at 43-134.
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II. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR
Clearly, a tension exists between the formation of rules of
law through the international acclaim of custom and the al-
most inevitable existence of an objector. Law created by accla-
mation conflicts with the traditional notion that states may
only be bound by their consent." The Rule of the Persistent
Objector has developed to remedy this problem. The Rule holds
that a state that persistently objects to an emerging rule of
customary international law will not be bound by it, despite
the new rule's binding effect upon other members of the inter-
national community. 6 The application of the Rule, however,
adds further ambiguities to the already ambiguous nature of
customary law. How persistent must the objector be? What
manner of objections are acceptable? Are all customs suscep-
tible to the Rule? These uncertainties may account for the fact
that the Persistent Objector Rule, while widely acclaimed by
international jurists, has not been frequently referred to by the
court. Moreover, it has never served as the primary basis for
an ICJ decision. Still, the Persistent Objector Rule remains, at
least in theory, a viable mechanism of international law. As
states turn themselves more and more to lawmaking in areas
of global effect, the role of objector may become more attractive
to states that fear the possible tyranny of the majority. Thus,
the scope of both terms used in the Rule's name remains un-
clear-there is much debate regarding what demonstrations of
objection a dissenting state must make, and how persistent
those objections must be."
A. Elements of the Rule
Defining the persistent objector rule as a mechanism of
international customary law becomes more difficult when the
boundaries of custom itself remain unclear. The court defines
3 See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
36 See Stein, supra note 14.
3 For an in-depth discussion of the requirements of state practice, see, e.g.,
ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1971);
H.WA. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 68 (1972);
David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 957 (1986).
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custom as: (1) the general and or universal acceptance; (2) of a
uniform practice; (3) for a considerable time period; and (4)
opinio juris." While seemingly clear, the problems of finding
the limits set by this definition become apparent when words
such as "general," "uniform" and "considerable" are applied to
the practices of states. Questions of how custom may be formed
and proven still trouble the international legal system, high-
lighting the difficulties in defining a rule which is itself an
outgrowth of a still-changing sphere of law.'
The name of the Rule itself suggests its elements. First, a
state must make an objection to an emerging custom so as to
put its neighbors on notice of its views. Second, such objection
must be made before the custom is formed, both persistently
and consistently, so as to solidify the state's status as an objec-
tor." The objection itself may come in two forms: (1) action, in
which the state exercises a particular legal right that is threat-
ened by the potential rise of a new custom; and (2) statements,
through which a state makes a declaration of position on a
legal right.41
' Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. & N.I. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 18) (separate
opinion of de Castro, J.)
" Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The International Court of Justice and the
TreatylCustom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. IT'L L.J. 347 (1981). Scott and Carr go so far
as to argue that even the effort of seeking such boundaries is futile. They state:
It is a mistake to regard international law as a set of authoritative rules
and principles for the standardization of conduct between nation states.
The nations of the world can and do violate or disregard international
legal standards when they think it is in their best interest to do so. ....
[Tjhere is little purpose in continuing the fiction that the rules and prin-
ciples associated with international law speak directly and primarily to
the nations of the world.
Id. at 357. While this view may be considered ultra-realist to the point of cyni-
cism, it does highlight a truism of the international system: Operating in a state
of anarchy, there is no authoritative force by which nations may be bound to fol-
low the rules to which they themselves profess to subscribe. A full analysis of the
nature of custom in international law is beyond the scope of this Note, but it will
be necessary to an understanding of the persistent objector since the criticisms of
the Rule will be similar to the criticisms of the system of international law itself.
See Stein, supra note 14, at 457-58.
41 See Coison, supra note 37, at 958.
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1. Manner of Objections
It may seem that the express statement of a government
provides the clearest indication of that state's policy and legal
views. The weight of such express statements, however, is
often difficult to determine due to the varied motivations with
which official statements may be made and the context within
which they are issued. Statements of policy are most often
made outside of a courtroom setting and thus may lack the
explicitness or precision needed for a legal analysis.4 2 The dif-
ferent categories and contexts of statements highlight these
varied considerations: 43
(a) Statements made during the establishment of a rule.
These statements offer perhaps the clearest indication of a
state's legal position, as they are made in a legal context. Such
statements include reservations or declarations filed upon
signing or ratifying a treaty or international agreement; state-
ments made during the final acts of diplomatic conferences and
other forms of diplomatic communication. Occurring during
legal acts, these statements may be phrased more deliberately
than statements made in other settings.44 Such a statement
was issued by the United States in its reservation to the 1977
Geneva Protocol Additional Number L" At the time of signa-
ture, the United States filed an "understanding" stating that
the regulations of the Protocol, addressing the treatment of
civilians in combat, "were not intended to have any effect on
and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons."46
This statement, accompanying an act creating a legal obliga-
tion, sought to define the state's understanding of that legal
act, and prevent that state from being bound later by a custom
formed by the practice evidenced in signing the treaty.
42 See Colson, supra note 37, at 958.
These categories are taken from Colson, supra note 37, at 959-60.
" Colson, supra note 37, at 959.
's See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
46 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 920 (John A.
Boyd ed., 1977). For a further discussion of statements issued by nuclear states
regarding the threat or use of nuclear weapons, see infra notes 145-152 and ac-
companying text.
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(b) Statements during negotiations. In this context, inter-
national law is used as a negotiating tool. States will invoke
international law as a justification or defense of their position,
or offer to change their position only so far as is necessary not
to prejudice a legal right."' The purpose with which such
statements may be offered, however, is in doubt-since the
parties to the negotiations usually are already aware of their
opponent's legal position, an invocation of international law in
this context "serves as filler, a means by which to posture, to
play to a domestic audience, or to make a statement for the
record with an eye to the future."8 Such a future, of course,
may include an appeal to the Persistent Objector Rule. State-
ments of this type were used by the United States in negotia-
tions surrounding the entry into force of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea HI ("UNCLOS Ilr). The
United States sought to preserve deep-seabed mining rights,
an area of the law of the sea regulated by this latest classifica-
tion of the law of the sea. The U.S. argued that existing law
already made the seabed res communis and, therefore, it
should remain free to exploit as states are able. This position
paved the way for the U.S. to sign UNCLOS I, with a sepa-
rate agreement on rights to the deep seabed."9
(c) Statements during domestic law making. International
law may be viewed as a coherent spectrum, ranging from laws
governing a small national municipality to the rules that
states agree upon to govern human relations.' With this co-
hesive character in mind, it may be understood that a state,
realizing that its domestic policy must be equally in accordance
with principles of international law as with those of its own
legal system, will make statements of domestic law necessarily
informed by an understanding of any international legal princi-
ple which may affect the operation of the domestic law."
' Colson, supra note 37, at 958.
Colson, supra note 37, at 959.
4' United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, With Annexes, and the
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, With Annexes, signed by the United States July
29, 1994, 1992 WL 725374.
Colson, supra note 37, at 959.
51 Monism, the theory that national and international law are part of the same
system of law, stands in opposition to dualism, which holds that lawmaking inside
and outside of states are merely parallel processes. For a more extensive discus-
164919961
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Thus, the passage of a domestic law which carries with it in-
ternational legal repercussions may be accompanied by a state-
ment of national position on the relation between the new do-
mestic statute and existing international law. 2 The United
States and the law of the sea provide an example. In the 1983
Ocean Policy Statement, President Reagan proclaimed a 200-
nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, but stated that the
establishment of this zone did not affect already existing rights
regarding migratory fish stocks.53
The slippery nature of the naked statement has led some
to discount it entirely as a source of custom and, therefore, a
tenable method of objection.
A State may make certain claims in its diplomatic correspondence,
but these often clash with competing claims of other States and thus
are not a reliable indicator of the content of international law ....
A State may say many things; it speaks with many voices, some re-
flecting divisions within top governmental circles. ... But a State
can act in only one way at one time, and its unique actions, recorded
in history, speak eloquently and decisively.54
While a physical act certainly provides the most easily under-
stood example of a state's legal position, only a minority sub-
scribe to such a strict definition of state action.5 The problem
sion of the competing theories, see WESTON, supra note 23, at 171-201.
52 Colson cites statements issued by the United States in connection with the
law of the sea as a prime example of this practice, including the 1945 Truman
Proclamation, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Magnuson Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act, the 1983 Regan Economic Zone Proclamation and
the 1983 Ocean Policy Statement. See Colson, supra note 37, at 959 (citations
omitted).
" Statement by the President on United States, Oceans Policy, Mar. 10, 1983,
19 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 383-84 (Mar. 14, 1983),
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 461, 464-65 (1983). The United States, along with the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Japan, were among the last countries to accept the right of
states to legally claim territorial seas in excess of three nautical miles. The U.S.
finally acceded to the established custom allowing a 12-mile territorial sea and
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, in which a state would have sole jurisdiction
over economic activity, such as fishing. However, when making this statement, the
President was careful to state that the acceptance of this custom did not change
existing United States policies on migratory fish stocks. Id. This statement would
seem to protect the right of U.S. fishing boats to pursue highly migratory tuna
stocks into the economic zones of other states. See Jonathan Charney, The Persis-
tent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 12-15 (1985).
" See D'AMATO, supra note 37, at 45.
D'AMATO, supra note 37, at 45.
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inherent in requiring action in order to defend a legal right
becomes readily apparent-an objector would be compelled to
confront its adversaries not just on the diplomatic level, but
physically as well. Placing a state in a position where it must
make active use of a right or forfeit it permanently would in-
vite constant exercise of rights for the sole purpose of preserv-
ing them. Further, the exercise of an unpopular right could
provoke acts by the objector state's legal opponents. To re-
quire such confrontation in order for a state to assert a legal
position seems both to defeat the legal process, designed to
avoid confrontation, and to waste the resources of the state
compelled to act for no other reason than to make a legal as-
sertion. A broader and less confrontational definition of state
action would include not just physical acts, but a variety of the
statements discussed above. Of course, including statements as
state action forces the international lawmaker to interpret the
often equivocal nature of such statements.'
The problem presented by a strict definition of state action
is illustrated by the obvious problems that would arise in limit-
ing the nuclear objector to acts alone: No one would advocate a
renewal of the use of nuclear weapons merely to safeguard a
legal right.' Thus, given the peculiar nature of the practices
governed by the ICJs decision on the use or threat of nuclear
weapons, evidence of physical acts may be unavailable, and
dependence on statement and treaty must serve to constitute
the necessary element of state action.
B. The Element of Persistence
In analyzing the necessary quantitative element of the
rule, the lack of an actual example of the persistent objector
among international actors poses a problem: Because the rule
has been infrequently invoked, the boundaries of objection
remain unclear.59 Still, certain objective facets of this element
s See WESTON ET AL., supra note 23, at 81.
See infra notes 162-165 and accompanying text
' It must be remembered that the GA request did not speak only to the legal-
ity of the use of nuclear weapons in wartime, but to the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons at any time. See U.N. CHARTER art 96.
r' See infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the histor-
ical application of the Rule.
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must remain. First, the objection must be lodged before the
formation of a recognized custom of international law. Because
customs are often the product of decades, if not centuries, of
conduct, the precise moment of a custom's formation may be
difficult to pinpoint. A dissenting state can and should be ex-
pected to voice an objection in response to a forming custom in
some public forum, most notably through treaty reservations,
statements of policy or United Nations resolutions." The dis-
senting state should meet public statements of legal policy
with a public objection if it hopes to put the global community
on notice that it plans to reserve a certain legal right under
current international law. Second, and closely related to the
element of time, is an element of consistency-a state must
frame and adhere to an objection in such a way as to make its
legal position clear. "Such a requirement would push potential
objectors to formulate their objections in principled terms, and
this might result in a fuller consideration of the general inter-
national interest."6'
In evaluating the boundaries of the necessary persistence
required under the Rule, the nature of the custom itself must
determine the nature of the objection required. In a case such
as that confronting the court when it evaluated a possible cus-
tom prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, the anticipated
scope of effect of the customary rules prohibiting the threat or
use of nuclear weapons will concern the entire international
community. The custom will speak directly to the manner in
which global peace and security are maintained. Within such a
large group of concerned states, it is most likely that there will
be no consensus regarding a newly recognized rule of law but
rather, sharply divided groups of states.6 2 Under these condi-
tions, an objector need not be as aggressive in its objection as a
state fending off the pressure of an international community
See Stein, supra note 14, at 467. Stein observes that the ICJ "has not made
clear what a dissenting state must do to maintain an objection." The Asylum Case
(Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277-78 (Nov. 27), implies that a refusal to join a
multilateral convention because of an objection to one or more of its provisions
suffices to qualify a state as a persistent objector. But the North Sea Continental
Shelf Case (F.R.G. v. DenJNeth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), implies that such an act
must be accompanied by other manifestations of dissent. Stein, supra note 14, at
478 n.62.
Stein, supra note 14, at 479.
62 Colson, supra note 37, at 967.
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united behind a new custom. Rather, the objector may phrase
its argument in such a manner so as to attempt to persuade
other states that its view is not an exception, but should be
considered the rule.' Indeed, as will be shown, the tack taken
by the nuclear states in the debates surrounding the case be-
fore the ICJ has been to argue the that nuclear weapons are
legal under all existing international law, rather than to ac-
knowledge, and object to, any perceived emerging customs of
law.'
C. History of the Rule
The ICJ has expressed support for the Rule in two cases.
In the Asylum Case,' Columbia argued that Peru was bound
by a Latin American custom allowing a particular type of polit-
ical asylum. The court found insufficient evidence to support
the formation of even a regional custom. Instead, the court
stated that "even if it could be supposed that such a custom ex-
isted between certain Latin-American States only, it could not
be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude
adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it.' s In the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ found that a coast-
line delimitation rule espoused by the United Kingdom "would
appear to be inapplicable as against Norway, in as much as
she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwe-
gian coast."' Interestingly, these dual affirmations of the Per-
sistent Objector Rule were not part of the holding of either
case, but "pure dictum.' While these cases support the Rule
in theory, the court has yet to use it in a decisive manner.'
Of course, disuse by the court, or even by states, does not
vitiate a rule of international law. The Persistent Objector
Rule draws its strongest support from publicists, the scholars
of international law. The writings of "noted publicists" are not
only commentary on the international system, but may them-
Colson, supra note 37, at 968.
See infra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 27).
6 Id. at 277.
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18).
Stein, supra note 14, at 460.
Charney, supra note 53, at 11.
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selves serve as the basis for an international rule, as recog-
nized by the ICJ Statute.7" Indeed, the writings of publicists
served as the basis for the discussion of the Rule in the
pleadings of the Fisheries Case.7 Notably, none of the writers
relied upon by the court used actual instances of the applica-
tion of the Rule. Instead, they relied upon the logical necessity
of the Rule in a consent based system of law.72 If the rule of
law in an international system is based upon the ultimate
consent of states to be governed, it must follow that, even
granting the binding power of custom upon a silent state, the
state that acts to preserve its rights must be recognized."
Thus, the persistent objector has been recognized as a funda-
mental part of a consent based system of international law.7 4
More recently, scholars have addressed the possible revival of
the Rule in international relations to meet the needs of the
changing international system. It remains to be seen whether
the principle of persistent objectors, accepted by scholars, will
find wider application in the practice of states.75
D. The Rule and Consent in International Lawmaking
Aside from the Asylum Case and Anglo-Norwegian Fisher-
ies Case, the Rule has been conspicuously absent from the in-
ternational scene. Potential objectors have twice refused to
resort to the Rule in legal conflicts. The first of these conflicts
arose in the Soviet Union's position on the development of cus-
toms regarding sovereign immunity.76 While the Soviet Union
had voiced continued objection to any limitations on the old
rule of absolute sovereign immunity, no benefits accrued to the
Soviet Union when custom placed restrictions on a sovereign's
,0 ICJ STATUTE art. 39.
" Counter Memorial of Norway (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Fisher-
ies) 381-84; Reply of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Pleadings (2
Fisheries) 428-29.
" See Stein, supra note 14, at 460, for citations to the scholars relied upon by
Norway in their appeal to the Rule.
" The consent theory of international law is discussed at length above. See
supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
74 Stein, supra note 14, at 459-63.
7' For a discussion of the possible future expansion of the use of the Rule in
international law, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
76 See Stein, supra note 14, at 460.
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immunity to suit in a foreign country." Soviet agencies and
enterprises were placed under the same restrictions as states
that had not objected, becoming subject to suit in domestic
courts. Curiously, not only was the Soviet Union not granted
special status as an objector, it failed to maintain a defense
using the Rule in any cases that arose under the newly restric-
tive custom.78
The second case is that of South Africa's failure to appeal
to the Persistent Objector Rule in disputing judgments that
apartheid violated international law. Despite South Africa's
notorious intransigence during the formation of a custom op-
posed to the human rights violations inherent in apartheid,"9
"this status did not immunize South Africa... from the appar-
ent consensus of the international community that [it is] obli-
gated not to practice apartheid .... In all respects, the inter-
national community has treated [it] as [a] serious violator[ I of
a rule of international law, their status as a persistent objector
notwithstanding.""0
In light of the paucity of real-world examples, the Rule
seems to be more a tool of the scholar than of the diplomat.
However, the Rule fills a logical gap in the framework of inter-
national customary law, a gap created by the "consent" theory
of lawmaking. The necessity of demonstrating a "general prac-
tice" upon which custom must be built indicates the consensual
nature of international law." The Persistent Objector Rule is
a logical product of the consent theory. The need for consent
arises because
the international legal order lacks a hierarchically superior sover-
eign authorized to prescribe rules for the subjects of the order. In
The United State's Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act states that sovereign
immunity is waived, for instance, when a foreign sovereign engaged in commercial
activity with a U.S. nexus or committed noncommercial torts in the United States.
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), (5). For a further
discussion of sovereign immunity, see GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGA-
TION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 56-66 (3d ed. 1996).
Stein, supra note 14, at 461.
7, See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of "Apartheid," GA Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at
75, U.N. Doc. A19030 (1973). The Convention, which entered into force in 1976,
was signed and ratified by 76 nations.
Charney, supra note 69, at 15.
" See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 24.
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the absence of such a sovereign, law must result from the concur-
rent wills of states and, at the very least, cannot bind a state that
has manifestly and continuously refused to accept it.82
Yet, "general acceptance" is not synonymous with universal
acceptance. The Persistent Objector Rule merely qualifies the
general rule that a state's positive sign of acceptance is not
necessary to bind a state to an emerging custom of internation-
al law. Newly established states or states not directly affected
by a new rule that do not comment on a new rule and could
not have objected during the rule's formation will nonetheless
be bound to the custom.83
Binding a state to a custom without its express consent
may seem to weaken the premise that consent forms the basis
of international law. If the consent theory is indeed invalid,
the Persistent Objector Rule itself would be superfluous. The
Rule has no real place in the legal regime if the consent of a
state is immaterial to the formation of a general rule of cus-
tomary law.' However, while the consent theory may recall
an older, more positivist legal system, it remains the touch-
stone of many theorists' and a suitable basis for sustaining
the Rule. The tension between a weakened theory of consent
and the persistent objector may be reconciled by focusing on
the importance of consent, not from a state in particular, but
from the international system as a whole." In this case, the
Rule becomes an important bridge between consent theory and
custom as a source of law-while silent states may be bound to
customs, consent is still respected, provided a state take a
more active stance in the preservation of its interests.
An alternative basis for linking the Rule to a consent
based legal system is a finding of "implied consent" through
silence. This, in effect creates a legal presumption of consent if
82 Stein, supra note 14, at 459.
See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 16-17.
" D'AMATO, supra note 37, at 187.
See, e.g., D'AMATO, supra note 37, at 188; Akehurst, supra note 32, at 26;
I.C. MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BRr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 115 (1957).
6 Henkin, supra note 13, at 59 ("Consent of the system need not include the
consent of all States but it must have the consent or acquiescence of many, varied
States, 'active' States, influential States, those that may be deemed to represent
the whole system on a particular issue . . .
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no active objection is heard from a state." Theories of "sys-
temic" or "implied" consent will effectively increase the role of
the Persistent Objector Rule, especially in light of the growing
place of custom in the creation of international law. Over the
past several decades, there have been "organized efforts by
large groups of states to change established law, or to create
new norms, without resort to multilateral treaty, claiming to
do so by practice resulting in customary law."' Such efforts
include United Nations General Assembly resolutions to de-
clare or to confirm principles of law by overwhelming majori-
ties or by consensus resolutions which discourage dissent."
The growing use of custom as a means to create law marks a
new development in international law, and presents a threat to
those states that, in the past, have been dominant forces in
international law.9" In the past, when rules of international
law were formed most often by treaty, an advantage accrued to
those states in the strongest negotiating position. These states
were usually the developed nations that had sufficient political
and economic strength to push for beneficial treaty terms 91
Formulation of law through custom, however, provides a great-
er opportunity for developing nations to play a part in the law-
making process because the formation of a rule of custom does
not require the explicit consent of a treaty signature. Thus,
these developing nations, working through international orga-
nizations, may be able to orchestrate the purposeful formation
of customs, potentially against the interests of the developed
states.
The Rule will become an attractive option for two very
dissimilar groups: the developed states, seeking protection
from a hostile majority within international custom-making
bodies; and developing, often newly independent states, wish-
See D'AMATO, supra note 37, at 188; Charney, supra note 69, at 16.
s' Henkin, supra note 13, at 58.
Henkin, supra note 13, at 58.
Stein, supra note 14, at 465-66:
[Tihe ability to exert power in defense of objectives regarding the shape
of the law has diminished as the arena for law-making has become more
and more formalized and institutionalized. One of the consequences of
this shift is that the states controlling a preponderant portion of global
military capabilities are far less able to insure that their legal views
prevail than were their nineteenth century counterparts.
"' Stein, supra note 14, at 467-68.
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ing to use the international legal regime to their benefit. 2
The Rule appears to be a mechanism by which states may
participate in the formation of international law without
threatening their sovereignty. It helps to avoid the logical and
practical difficulties which would arise from adherence to a
strict theory of consent, or to a policy of binding dissenters to
new rules of law. Under a strict consent theory, "the dissent of
a single State could prevent the creation of a new rule, [and]
new rules would hardly ever be created. If a dissenting State
could be bound against its will, customary law would in effect
be created by a system of majority voting."93 The persistent
objector is now only a tool for the scholar; its great utility indi-
cates that it may soon become a tool for the lawmaker as well.
III. SHOULD THE NUCLEAR STATES BE PERMITTED THE
DEFENSE OF THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR?
A. Rules of Customary Law Limiting the Use of Nuclear
Weapons
Despite their relatively new place in the arsenal of na-
tions, nuclear weapons fall under the jurisdiction of already
existing international law. The emergence of a new weapon
does not force states to adopt rules specifically governing its
use. Rather, the weapon and its use must be governed by ex-
isting rules of war. Otherwise, advancing technology would
render all of international law obsolete. This principle was
embodied in the de Martens clause included in the Hague
Peace Convention of 1907 ("Hague IV"):
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued,
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in
cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabit-
ants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usage
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and
the dictates of the public conscience.94
92 Stein, supra note 14, at 467-68.
13 Akehurst, supra note 33, at 26.
" Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
with Annex of Regulations, opened for signature Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
U.N.T.S. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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This expression of the desire of nations has been consistently
repeated in treaties following Hague IV, most notably the 1949
Geneva Convention.95 Lacking an express rule speaking to the
use of nuclear weapons, parties on both sides of the issue, in
the spirit of the de Martens clause, turned to other recognized
rules of law to regulate the use of these weapons.'
1. Principles of Customary Humanitarian Law
The court examined several different areas of customary
law that might affect the legality of the threat or use of nude-
ar weapons. Primary among these were the spheres of humani-
tarian and environmental law. It was in the field of humani-
tarian law that the court found customs that would severely
limit the legal use of nuclear weapons.' The de Martens
clause recognizes that the use of force, even when sanctioned
by rules of international law, is subject to the limitations of
, Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.LA.S. No. 3365 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950). For an extensive list of the appearance of the De Martens
clause in international agreements, see Peter Weiss et al, Draft Memorial in Sup-
port of the Application by the World Health Organization for an Advisory Opinion
by the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons Under International Law, Including the W.H.O. Constitution (1994).
Notably, some states did indeed argue that there had developed a specific
rule of customary law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons. These
states pointed to the consistent passage of UN resolutions reaffirming the illegality
of nuclear weapons as evidence of an emergent opinio juris among states. See
Written Submission of the Solomon Islands at 28-29 (as the written submissions
had not been published at press time, hereinafter pinpoint citations will refer to
the original draft of the statement submitted by each state) (on file with author);
see also Written Submission of New Zealand at 4. While such resolutions can
illustrate the emergence of a custom, the court did not find sufficient unanimity
among the community of states to constitute a customary rule:
Examined in their totality, the General Assembly resolutions put before
the Court declare that the use of nuclear weapons would be a "direct
violation of the Charter of the United Nations," and in certain formula-
tions that such use "should be prohibited. The focus of these resolutions
has sometimes shifted to diverse related matters; however, several of the
resolutions under consideration in the present case have been adopted
with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions; thus, al-
though those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the
problem of nuclear weapons, they still fall far short of establishing an
opinio juris on the illegality of the use of such weapons.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 26.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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those same rules. The principles of humanitarian law apply to
govern the manner in which violence may be used against a
belligerent state-in essence, a last effort to control a situation
that international law itself seeks to avoid. The St. Petersburg
Declaration of 1868, one of the earliest codifications of this
area of international customary law, declares that, within
certain limits, "the necessities of war ought to yield to the de-
mands of humanity.""8 The states supporting a custom prohib-
iting nuclear weapons argued that these weapons violated sev-
eral aspects of this humanitarian law.9 9
a. The Prohibition Against Causing Unnecessary Suffering
The de Martens clause also functions in close connection
with another axiom of jus in bello-that the right to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. As the Clause
advises, the "laws of humanity" and the "dictates of the public
conscience" are to govern the conduct of war.' 0 These princi-
ples are expressed in the customary law that warfare is not to
be conducted in such a way as to inflict cruel or unnecessary
injury upon combatants or to aggravate suffering for civil-
ians.' ° Indeed, this overarching principle, especially as ap-
plied to weapons of mass destruction, has long affected the
development of jus in bello.'0 2
" Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INTL L. 95
(Supp. 1907) [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].
"9 See Written Submission of the Solomon Islands, supra note 96, at 77-103;
Written Submission of India at 3-5 (as the written submissions had not been pub-
lished at press time, hereinafter pinpoint citations will refer to the original draft
of the statement submitted by each state) (on file with author); Written Submis-
sion of Ecuador at 2; Written Submission of Mexico at 11-15; Written Submission
of Sweden at 3-5; Written Submission of New Zealand, supra note 96, at 15-24.
1" See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 94, § II, ch. I, art. 22; see also Pro-
tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June
8, 1977, 1977 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 95, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (entered into force Dec.
7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I].
101 See Hague Convention, supra note 94, at arts. 22-23.
0 G.A. Res. 1653, supra note 22, notes that the use of weapons of mass de-
struction which cause unnecessary human suffering are "contrary to the laws of
humanity and international law," and cites the Declaration of St. Petersburg of
1868, the Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874, the Convention of The
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as
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Significant evidence exists indicating that the necessary
effects of a nuclear weapon, regardless of size, will violate this
principle. Such effects range from immediate devastation of
surrounding territory, to the horrible nature of radiation-in-
duced injuries, to the long-range genetic effects on a popula-
tion.0 3 Of special note here should be the dissenting opinions
of Judges Weeramantry and Koroma, both of whom argued
that the court erred in not extending the prohibition on the
threat or use of nuclear weapons to any circumstance."'
Judge Weeramantry includes an extensive discussion of the
effects of nuclear weapons upon a population, both in the short
term, including nuclear winter and great loss of life, and more
long range damages, including congenital birth defects and
damage to food productivity."5
b. The Principle of Discrimination
It is a central tenet of jus in bello that states are to con-
duct hostilities in such a way as is necessary to achieve a legal
military objective without imposing undue suffering upon com-
batants. Vital to this principle is the ability of warring parties
to limit damage inflicted upon an enemy. Thus, it is necessary
to create regulations of the means and methods of warfare that
allow for a distinction between combatants and civilian popula-
tions. 6 This principle is codified in international law by Pro-
tocol I of 1977,107 which characterizes any attack as indis-
examples of international instruments supporting the principle of which a "mijori-
ty of nations are still parties.' (citations omitted).
"0 On the nature and effect of nuclear weapons, see WORLD HEALTH ORGANI-
ZATION, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES (2d ed.
1987); Report of the Secretary.General on Nuclear Weapons, General and Complete
Disarmament: Comprehensiue study on Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. A1451373 U.N.
Sales No. E.811.11 (1990).
10 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. - (July 8)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma at 4-6) (as the dissenting opinions had not
been published at press time, hereinafter pinpoint citations will refer to the origi-
nal drafts of the opinions rendered) (on file with author and also available on the
Internet at Cornell Law Library, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
(last modified Sept. 1996) <http:J/www.law.cornelLeduicjicjl/opinion.htm>); id. (dis-
senting opinion of Judge Weeramantry at 111).
"0 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, supra note 104, at 20-37.
101 J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 153 (1924) (quoted in Weiss et aL, supra note 95, at 60).
"7 Protocol I, supra note 100, at art. 51.
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criminate that is to be expected to cause injury to civilians or
civilian objects "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."0 8
Advocates of a custom prohibiting nuclear weapons de-
pended upon studies of the effects of the use of nuclear weap-
ons as weapons of mass destruction with long-lasting effects on
the health of surrounding populations. These weapons, as the
studies showed, by their nature violate the principle of discrim-
ination."9 In response, the nuclear states argued that the ef-
fects of nuclear weapons were highly variable and depended
entirely upon the size of the particular warhead used and the
circumstances surrounding its detonation. A small, relatively
"clean" weapon, it was argued, could be deployed to fulfill a
legitimate military objective without collateral effect upon
civilian populations."0 This argument was roundly rejected
by the states advocating the illegality of nuclear weapons,
which argued that the long term effects of even a small nuclear
detonation are uncontrollable.
c. The Principle of Proportionality
Closely linked to the principle of discrimination, propor-
tionality holds that an attack or counter-attack must inflict a
harm or achieve an objective in proportion to the provocation.
This custom has been recognized by the court in the Paramili-
tary Activities in Nicaragua Case,"' and is generally recog-
Protocol I, supra note 100, at art. 51.
1 For a detailed analysis of the effects of a nuclear explosion, see General and
Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/35/392, U.N. Sales No. 80-21331 (1980). Notably,
this study includes analysis of small, so-called "tactical" nuclear weapons. See also
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, supra note 104, at 20-35.
o The United Kingdom argued as follows:
[N]uclear weapons might be used in a wide variety of circumstances with
very different results in terms of likely civilian casualties. In some cases,
such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the
High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible to envis-
age a nuclear attack which caused comparatively few civilian casualties.
It is by no means the case that every use of nuclear weapons against a
military objective would inevitably cause very great collateral civilian
casualties.
Written Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 27, at 53; see Written
Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 23.
. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-
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nized as grounded in the Charter of the United Nations itself.
Taken together, Articles 2(4) and 33(1) of the Charter,"
which command member states to refrain from the threat or
use of force in their relations and to refrain from conduct
which is likely to endanger international peace and security,
have been interpreted to place severe constraints upon a
state's right to carry out reprisals against an attacker, even in
cases of self-defense."' Specifically, a state does not have the
right to inflict reprisals upon civilian populations. This princi-
ple has been enunciated by the United Nations in General
Assembly Resolution 2675 (XXV) on Basic Principles for the
Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts,"' and
in treaty through Protocol I.
In response, the nuclear states again argued that, as with
the principle of discrimination, the varied effects and uses of
nuclear weapons rendered impossible a blanket finding that
nuclear weapons violated the principle of proportionality.'
The court, however, faced with overwhelming evidence of the
widespread and devastating effects of nuclear weapons did find
that the use of nuclear weapons would violate these basic ten-
ets of humanitarian law in almost any circumstance:
[lethods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinc-
tion between civilian and military targets, or which would result in
unnecessary suffering to combatants are prohibited. In view of the
unique characteristics of nuclear weapons ... the use of such
weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such
requirements. 7
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (Nicaragua sued the United States
for sponsoring insurgents during the Nicaraguan civil war. The court found this
sponsorship to be a prohibited act of aggression.).
112 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, T 4; art. 33, S] 1.
113 See GEORGE SCRWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151
(1960).
11 GA Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc.
A18028 (1970) (stating that civilian populations shall not be the subject of repri-
sals).
11 See Hague Convention, supra note 88, at art. 51(6) ("reprisals against the
persons and objects protected by this Part are prohibited'), art. 51(6) ("Attacks
against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals is prohibited.'), art.
55(2) ("Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibit-
ed.").
.. See Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 23; see also
Written Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 27, at 53.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 32. The court balked at applying the
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Thus, the court found the threat or use of nuclear weapons to
be severely curtailed not through the enunciation of a new
custom of international law, but through already existing, and
widely adhered to, customs of humanitarian law.
2. Nuclear Weapons and Customs of International
Environmental Law
The same indiscriminate, adverse effects of nuclear weap-
ons which the court found violative of existing norms of hu-
manitarian law may also violate existing and forming rules of
environmental law. Protection of the environment has become
linked with humanitarian law."' The international communi-
ty now recognizes that natural resources are vital and neces-
sary to the development of many developing states, and inter-
national law has responded accordingly by codifying rules for
their protection."' The non-nuclear states argued that the
prohibition to the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance due to an
unwillingness to balance the competing legal interests of humanitarian law and
the right to self-defense. Where a state depended upon nuclear weapons for de-
fense, the fundamental laws of humanitarian law would be set directly opposed to
the fundamental right to self-defense in a circumstance in which the very survival
of a state would be threatened. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 33. Sever-
al dissenters, however, had no trouble conducting such a balancing of interests:
[Wihen the Court is faced with two competing principles or rights, it
should jurisprudentially assign a priority to one of them and cause it to
prevail . . .. The suggestion that it should be left to individual States to
determine whether or not it may be lawful to have recourse to nuclear
weapons, is not only an option fraught with serious danger ... but may
also suggest that such an option is not legally reprehensible.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, supra note 104, at 4.
18 This connection is recognized by Protocol I, supra note 100, arts. 35(3), 55(1)
("It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long term and severe damage to the envi-
ronment.").
119 See, e.g., Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened
for signature Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988)
(Article 2(1) reads: "The parties shall take appropriate measures ... to protect
human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to
result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone lay-
er"); Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (Article 3 states: "States have,
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of inter-
national law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
[Vol. 62: 16351664
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unavoidable environmental effects of nuclear weapons will
necessarily be so far reaching as to violate a customary prohi-
bition of excessive environmental damage in times of war.'
However, arguments based on the protection of human
health and the environment went beyond the obligations ofjus
in bello that relate to the environment to include basic ele-
ments of humanitarian law as well. The link between environ-
mental law and human rights can be established two ways.
First, nuclear weapons by their nature may already violate
existing principles of international law as it relates to the
obligations of a state. This was the argument made by New
Zealand and Australia in the Nuclear Test Cases:' Radioac-
tive fallout, through its invasive nature, violated existing rules
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.'). For an exhaustive
list of international instruments on the protection of the environment, see Weiss et
al, supra note 95, at 42-44.
' Protocol I provides: "It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage to the natural environment." Protocol I, supra note 100, at art. 35(3).
In addition, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Techniques ("ENMOD") obligates the parties "not to engage
in military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or
injury to any other State party." 31 U.S.T. 333, at art. 1 reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 88
(1977). It was argued that these two treaties illustrated a rule of customary law
against harming the environment in times of war. See Written Submission of the
Solomon Islands, supra note 96, at 62-63; see also Written Submission of Samoa at
1 (as the written submissions had not been published at press time, hereinafter
pinpoint citations will refer to the original draft of the statement submitted by
each state) (on file with author). The response of the nuclear states was to argue
that nuclear weapons, as such, were not primarily aimed at environmental modifi-
cation and, therefore, were exempted from consideration under such treaties. See
Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 29-30. The response of
the non-nuclear states is summed up in Judge Weeramantrys dissent:
The question is not whether nuclear weapons were or were not intended
to be covered by these formulations. It is sufficient to read them as stat-
ing undisputed principles of customary international law. To consider that
these general principles are not explicit enough to cover nuclear weapons,
or that nuclear weapons were designedly left unmentioned and are there-
fore not covered, or even that there was a clear understanding that these
provisions were not intended to cover nuclear weapons, is to emphasize
the incongruity of prohibiting lesser weapons of environmental damage,
while leaving intact the definitely greater agency of causing the very
damage which it was the rationale of the treaty to prevent.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, supra note 104, at 66-67.
"2 Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 LC.J. 135 (June 22); Nuclear Tests (Aust.
v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (June 22).
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of treaty and custom insuring national sovereignty and free-
dom of the seas. 22 These basic rights were already insured
by the United Nations Charter in Articles 1 and 2.1' The
Charter also includes a more general provision of "good neigh-
borliness" in Article 74,124 which has been further refined in
the Corfu Channel Case, in which the ICJ recognized "every
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."125 These
basic obligations of environmental protection have become "so
deeply rooted in the conscience of mankind that they have
become particularly essential rules of general international
law."1 26 As such, it was argued by the non-nuclear states,
these principles formed a solid base of customary international
law which must be interpreted to prohibit the threat or use of
nuclear weapons. 27
A right to a clean environment may also be part of the
already existing set of inalienable human rights enunciated by
the basic human rights documents.12' Fundamental human
rights were specifically protected by both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protected the
right to life,'129 and the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which added specific protection for physical
122 Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. at 139 (June 22).
,23 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2. These articles state the purposes and principles of
the organization, including a commitment to solve international humanitarian prob-
lems and to respect the sovereign equality of all states.
12 Article 74 states as follows in pertinent part:
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of
the territories to which this Charter applies ... must be based on the
general principle of good neighborliness, due account being taken of the
interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic and
commercial matters.
U.N. CHARTER art. 74.
"2 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (April 9).
126 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 28th Session,
1976 Y.B. INTL L. COMM'N 109.
12 See Written Submission of Sweden, supra note 99, at 5; Written Submission
of the Solomon Islands, supra note 96, at 77-102; Written Submission of New Zea-
land, supra note 96, at 19-22.
126 See infra notes 200-207 and accompanying text; see also PAUL GORMLEY, HU-
MAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 40-
41 (1976).
.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967), 6 I.L.M. 368, at arts. 1, 6 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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and mental health.3 If the nuclear weapons threatened
these already established rights they would either have been
de jure illegal, or their use severely circumscribed. Unfortu-
nately, the court did not reach the merits of the Nuclear Test
Cases, so it remains unclear if such a link between human
rights and the environment might have been found.'31 These
issues were again placed before the court in consideration of
whether a custom exists prohibiting nuclear weapons. A key
element of the non-nuclear states' argument was as it was in
the Nuclear Test Cases twenty years ago: that the indiscrimi-
nate and uncontainable nature of radioactive fallout, regard-
less of whether the use of nuclear weapons was peaceful, as in
testing, or as a weapon of war, violated fundamental customs
of humanitarian law. The disaster at the nuclear power plant
at Chernobyl graphically illustrated the threat posed by this
by-product of the use of nuclear weapons.' The observed ef-
" International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, GJA. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967), 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967). at arts. 1, 12 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976).
" Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20). In his separate opin-
ion, Judge Petren observed that while human rights law was evolving, its jurispru-
dence had not yet reached a point where it could be universally applied to a sub-
ject like nuclear testing. Judge Petren also commented on the difficulty in distin-
guishing the necessary element of opinio juris in a proposed custom against nucle-
ar testing: It would be difficult to determine whether a state capable of nuclear
testing abstained from doing so out of a sense of legal obligation. Judge Petren
wrote:
It is only an evolution subsequent to the Second World War which has
made the duty of States to respect the human rights of all, including
their own nationals, an obligation under international law towards all
States members of the international community .... It is certainly to
be regretted that this universal recognition of human rights should not,
up to now, have been accompanied by a corresponding evolution in the
jurisdiction of international judicial organs. For want of a watertight
system of appropriate jurisdictional clauses, too many international dis-
putes involving the protection of human rights cannot be brought to
international adjudication.
Id. at 487-88.
' See Lind A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident. A Case Study in International
Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12
COLuImi J. ENVTL. L. 203 (1987). On April 26, 1986, a coolant loss in a reactor at
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the former Soviet Union precipitated "the
worst accident in the history of nuclear energy." The resulting explosions and fire
spread a cloud of radiation that within a month had touched all of Europe, and
was even detectable in the United States, touching off panic throughout much of
Europe. Id. at 203-06.
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fects of the use of the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki also
offer a horrifying example."' Such a widespread threat to hu-
man health and natural resources would violate customs spe-
cifically prohibiting environmental damage, as well as impact
upon principles of territorial integrity and discrimination.1"
In response to these arguments, the court reaffirmed "the
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction and control respect the envi-
ronment of other States or of areas beyond national control is
now part of the corpus of international law relating to the en-
vironment.""5 But the right to self-defense again caused the
court to balk at an absolute finding that nuclear weapons were
prohibited:
The Court does not consider that the treaties in question could have
intended to deprive a State of it right of self-defence under interna-
tional law because of its obligations to protect the environment.
Nonetheless, States must take environmental considerations into
account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the
pursuit of legitimate military objections.13
However, the same balancing test that lead the court to limit a
state's right to use nuclear weapons to all but the most ex-
treme circumstance of self defense in the interest of protecting
human rights should also function to limit the use of nuclear
weapons to protect the environment as well. If nuclear weap-
ons could cause a catastrophe for the environment, as the court
recognized, how could their use, in any but the most extreme
situation, be "proportionate" to the environmental damage
caused?
13 The effects of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were well
documented in Judge Weeramantry's opinion. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Weeramantry, supra note 104, at 25-31.
... The most notable restatement of this custom came in the Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration (U.S. v. Can.) (1941), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1938, T 157 (1949) ("[U]nder the prin-
ciples of international law ... no State has the right to use or permit the use of
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another . . .when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.").
135 Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 15.
,' Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 15.
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B. The Nuclear States Meet the Description of the Persistent
Objector
An appeal to the Persistent Objector Rule will, admittedly,
be a last resort for the nuclear states. Such a defense would
require the international community to admit that a custom
exists which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons-a position
the nuclear states understandably are loathe to take, even in
the face of the court's recent decision.' Stronger legal argu-
ments may be made by attacking the consistency of state prac-
tice that the non-nuclear states argue create the customs of
humanitarian and environmental law addressed above."s
The nuclear states also chose to argue that the court should
have declined to grant an advisory opinion, finding the Request
to be both prohibitively vague and political in nature."s The
court, however, chose to reach the merits of the General As-
"' The United States, for instance, has been careful to make explicit that its
participation in instruments defining jus in beilo does not reach nuclear weapons.
Upon signing Protocol I, the United States filed a reservation stating. "It is the
understanding of the United States of America that the rules established by this
Protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit
the use of nuclear weapons." See DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTEIMA-
TIONAL LAW (J. Boyd ed., 1977) (quoted in Weiss et al., supra note 95, at 51).
Similar reservations were filed by the United ingdom and France. Weiss et al.,
supra note 95, at 51. While the Cold War has ended, deterrence remains a central
tenet of United States defense policy, and nuclear weapons a prime means of
deterrence. See NUCIEAR ARGUMENTS 1-45 (Lynn Eden ed., 1989). Notably, of the
nuclear states, only China has publicly stated that it will only use nuclear weap-
ons if subject to a nuclear attack. See Weiss et aL, supra note 95, at 11. This
importance placed on deterrence led the court to find that deterrence cannot be
considered a threat to use nuclear weapons that would be prohibited by customary
law:
The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the practice known as
the "policy of deterrence." It notes that it is a fact that a number of
States adhered to that practice during the greater part of the Cold War
and continue to adhere to it. Furthermore, the Members of the interna-
tional community are profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-
recourse to nuclear weapons over the past fifty years constitutes the ex-
pression of an opinio juris. Under these circumstances the Court does not
consider itself able to find that there is such an opinio juris.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 33.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 15. The United States did, however, al-
lude to its potential as an objector in its brief before the court: 'With respect to
the use of nuclear weapons, customary law could not be created over the objection
of the nuclear-weapon States, which are States whose interests are most specifical-
ly affected." Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 9.
1 See Weiss et al., supra note 95, at 10.
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sembly Request and, further, while not finding a rule of cus-
tomary law absolutely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons,
did find that nuclear weapons threatened basic elements of
humanitarian law. "
At this point, the nuclear states have the option of backing
out of the legal process entirely by refusing to recognize the
court's jurisdiction over the Request, and its subsequent opin-
ion.' Such a response would represent a great failure of the
system of international law, striking a severe blow to the ef-
forts of the nuclear states to use international law to govern
another aspect of nuclear politics: nuclear non-proliferation.
The nuclear states already use international law to regulate
the spread of nuclear weapons, through the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. 42 This treaty seeks to extract from the non-nuclear
states a pledge that they will not acquire nuclear weapons. But
the treaty also imposes upon the nuclear states an obligation
to pursue nuclear disarmament. The nuclear states have al-
ready drawn criticism for failing diligently to pursue this
goal.44 A refusal to be governed by international law in the
1 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 34. For a discussion of the elements
of humanitarian law found to be threatened by nuclear weapons, see supra notes
97-117 and accompanying text.
141 The United States had a similar response to a finding against it in the Case
Concerning Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua. See supra note 111. The possibili-
ty or probability of this response has led some to question the usefulness of an
advisory opinion. Judge Weeramantry responded to these concerns in his impres-
sive dissent:
[H]owever political the question, there is always value in the clarification
of the law. It is not ineffective, pointless and inconsequential. It is impor-
tant that the Court should assert the law as it is. A decision soundly
based on law will carry respect with it by virtue of its own inherent
authority. It will assist in building up a climate of opinion in which law
is respected. It will enhance the authority of the Court in that it will be
seen to be discharging its duty of clarifying and developing the law,
regardless of political considerations.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, supra note 104, at 108.
4 See supra note 21.
1 The recent controversy over the resumption of French nuclear testing high-
lights the seriousness with which the world community views any nuclear detona-
tion. The NPT includes a pledge by its nuclear signatories to work toward the
eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and accusations of failure to meet this
promise marred the recent NPT renewal talks in late 1994. See Jehl, supra note
21, § A3. The court also made unanimous note of the obligation in the Advisory
Opinion: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclu-
sion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control." Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 36.
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present case could cause additional doubt on the part of the
non-treaty states of the sincerity of the nuclear states to abide
by their treaty obligations. So if the nuclear states find their
foreign policies on the wrong side of a custom prohibiting the
use of nuclear weapons and yet desire to continue within the
system of international law, they may be able to find protec-
tion with shield of the persistent objector.
The basis for the nuclear state's status as persistent objec-
tors will be their participation in the treaties which govern
nuclear weapons themselves. States will use these internation-
al instruments as proof of state action implicitly adverse to a
custom prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons outright-if a
state is party to a treaty which regulates the use of nuclear
weapons, that state clearly believes that its use of such weap-
ons is indeed legal under the regime of those particular trea-
ties. It will be these treaties, and the conduct and statements
accompanying them, which will form the basis for the satisfac-
tion of the state action element of the Rule.
1. Instances of State Action
In their briefs before the court, the nuclear weapon states
pointed to both the actual deployment of nuclear weapons and
the existence of treaties surrounding their use as evidence of a
consistent belief, at least among a certain bloc of states, in the
legality of nuclear weapons.'" There are a number treaties
which prohibit the use of particular weapons in combat, includ-
ing biological and chemical weapons; environmental modifica-
tion techniques as weapons; exploding bullets; and weapons
with non-detectable fragments.' The existence of these
1" See Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 8-21; see
also Written Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 27, at 4061; Written
Submission of the Russian Federation, supra note 27, at 6-9.
"I For early examples of such agreements, see, e.g., St. Petersburg Declaration,
supra note 87 (The St. Petersburg Declaration was an effort by the Russian gov-
ernment to ban the use of =dumdum" bullets--projectiles designed to explode on
impact.); see also Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for
signature June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (taking its lead from trea-
ties between the great powers of the time banning the use of weapons named in
the title, this was an effort by the then developing countries to apply this stan-
dard to all states).
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agreements may represent a pattern in international practice.
If a specific prohibition against nuclear weapons existed in
international law, the nuclear states argued, it would have
been given form in a treaty speaking specifically to nuclear
weapons. 4 '
The nuclear states also argued that the existence of agree-
ments governing the use of nuclear weapons was itself indica-
tive of the absence of any general prohibition.'47 Primary
among these agreements are those which prohibit or regulate
the manufacture, testing or possession of nuclear weapons or
systems for their delivery, such as the 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty,4 ' the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,'49 the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty,50 the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty,'5 ' and the 1993 Treaty on the Elimination of
Strategic Offensive Arms. "2 The terms of these treaties, the
argument goes, implicitly acknowledge that the continued
possession and use of such weapons within the confines of
treaty limitations are not prohibited.
53
Further, the nuclear states point to treaties banning the
use of nuclear weapons in individual areas as indicative of an
absence of any overarching custom prohibiting possession.
These agreements include the Antarctic Treaty,'" prohibiting
146 See Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 10.
" See Written Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 27, at 23-24; see
also Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 11.
'" Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S.
43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963).
'" Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967).
15 See supra note 111.
... Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, 27 I.L.M. 84.
152 Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Committee for Defense Industry of the Russian Federation Con-
cerning Co-operation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms, Aug. 23,
1993, U.S.-Russia, 1992 WL 725374.
15 For instance, the United States pointed to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and the 1993 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms as
examples of treaties which specifically "sanction[ed] the need for deterrent nuclear-
weapon forces, prohibit[ed] the creation of destabilizing defenses against them, and
prohibitled] or restrict[ed] offensive forces that could destroy them." Written Sub-
mission of the United States, supra note 27, at 13.
... The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
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all nuclear explosions on the Antarctic continent and the Trea-
ty of Tlatelolco, prohibiting Latin American member states
from using nuclear weapons under any circumstances.'
These instruments, it was argued, would be meaningless or
redundant in the face of a custom prohibiting the use of nucle-
ar weapons under any circumstances. Further, the fact that
the nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons since World
War H does not in any way imply consent to an evolving rule
of custom. Such abstention from use would have to be under-
taken from a sense of legal obligation in order for the practice
to form the basis for a rule of customary law.'" As discussed
above, the action necessary to constitute an objection to a cus-
tomary rule may take a variety of forms, from actual exercise
of a legal right, to statements expressing a desire to preserve
the right. The nuclear states have both issued statements
particularly reserving the right to use nuclear weapons' and
continue to maintain foreign policy that relies upon potential
use of nuclear weapons a deterrent.m Both these statements
may satisfy the "action" requirement of the Rule.
Finally, the nuclear states presented their own consistent
possession and deployment of nuclear weapons as proof of an
active objection to any customary prohibition.' In fact, nu-
clear states argue that these deployment policies.. form an
essential plank in their exercise of the right to self-defense
under the UN Charter. 6' That such weapons have been used
infrequently need not detract from their value as deterrents
and, therefore, their continued "use" for purposes of rendering
U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force June 23, 1961).
" Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for
signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281, 6 I.L.M. 521 [hereinafter Tlatelolco
Treaty].
1" For the requirements for the formation of a rule of customary law, see supra
notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
1" See, e.g., the "nuclear understanding " filed by the United States upon signing
Protocol I. See supra note 137.
" See EDEN, supra note 137, at 109-72. In fact, this continued policy of deter-
rence, in part, stood in the way of the court finding a specific custom prohibiting
nuclear weapons. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 33.
" See Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 13; sce also
Written Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 27, at 28.
61 Deployment doctrines of nuclear states are discussed in the Report of the
Secretary-General on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 103, at 61-71.
161 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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the user a persistent objector. The position of the nuclear
states is best illustrated by their official statements. On April
5, 1995, the United States declared, in the context of the re-
cent conference on the extension of the NPT, that it
reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
weapon States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on
the United States ... carried out or sustained by such a non-nucle-
ar-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon
State.162
France, 6 ' Russia" 4  and the United Kingdom' made
statements identical in substance at the same time. Similar
reservations have been made by nuclear states when signing
treaties that may be interpreted as encompassing nuclear
weapons." Certainly, such specific statements of a state's
motivation and legal view must be taken as a valid vehicle of
objection.
C. Nuclear Weapons and the Policy Goals of the Persistent
Objector Rule
Because the policy goal of the Rule is to facilitate smooth
operation of the international community and to encourage
participation in the lawmaking process, the Rule should not be
used when it would defeat these purposes. If the presence of
the objector is so disruptive to the international community, no
amount of facilitation will help. Accordingly, several theories
have arisen through which a persistent objector may be bound
when the policy goals of the Rule are not met.
162 See Written Submission of the United States, supra note 27, at 16 (citing
Letter Dated 6 April 1995 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mis-
sion of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Sec-
retary General, U.N. Doc. A/50/153, U.N. Sales No. 95-10060 (1995)).
163 Letter Dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of France to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/50/164, U.N.
Sales No. 95-10060 (1995).
16 Letter Dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the Rus-
sian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/50/151, U.N. Sales No. 95-10072 (1995).
1 Letter Dated 6 April 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/50/152, U.N. Sales No. 95-10054 (1995).
16 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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1. The Objector Will Bow to Diplomatic Pressure
The Persistent Objector Rule allows dissenting states to
shield themselves from expansive and rapidly developing cus-
tomary law. Yet, this protection may only be transient. The
absence of the persistent objector on the international scene
indicates that the Rule, while legally sound, does not provide a
sufficient political shield to sustain the dissenting state. Over
time, that state will be pressured to accede to the will of the
majority as the political isolation that comes from being in an
unpopular minority grows. This isolation may be expressed
through United Nations resolutions which condemn the action
of the dissenting state, as well as the writings of jurists."
The pressure has been characterized as so "extreme" that few
objectors will seek actively to enforce their claimed reserved
rights after the custom has been formed."
The failed objections of the United States, United Kingdom
and Japan to expanded coastal state jurisdictions have been
cited as examples of this effect." Throughout the period dur-
ing which the rule establishing a customary right to a 200-
nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone was in effect, these
three states clung to the twelve-mile limit established by earli-
er treaty.7 ° Yet, even when accused of violating the territory
of other coastal states by condoning fishing within their exclu-
sive zone, the United States did not appeal to the Rule. Nor
was there any reference on the part of the aggrieved states
that the US might be due some special privilege due to its
objector's status.' Even if opportunities for the objector in-
crease in the future, through the increased rate of customary
law formation, this pressure will remain, focused by the grow-
ing mechanisms through which custom is established.
Political isolation may be a strong factor in influencing
state practice; however, it will necessarily be balanced by the
importance of that practice to the dissenting state. It is unlike-
" See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 27.
16 See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 27.
"' See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 22; see also Charney, supra note 69, at 27.
170 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964).
17 See Stein, supra note 14, at 462.
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ly, then, that the potential nuclear objector will fold to this
type of pressure. Past cases of the failure of the Rule to aid an
objector, such as the Soviet Union's objection over the limita-
tion of sovereign immunity and the United States' eventual
acceptance of the 200-mile fisheries zone, have not dealt with
issues vital to security. The nuclear states, being among the
wealthiest states in the international community, are thus well
placed to resist diplomatic pressure. Further, it is doubtful
that these states will give up a device central to their security
schemes in the face of diplomatic protest from world bodies.
2. Targets of Specific Rules Will Be Bound Despite
Objection
Pressure for a state to conform to a custom will be in-
creased if the objector itself causes the new custom. Professor
Stein draws an interesting parallel between the absence of an
appeal to the Rule in both the cases of South Africa's apartheid
and the Soviet Union's sovereign immunity.' "In each case,
the state ... identified as the objector was the specific target
of the emerging norm .... [T]he norm in each case was moti-
vated by the practices of these states; their exemption from its
application would largely deprive the rule of its intended ef-
fect."' In each case, the potential objector was not an ob-
server to an emergent international customary law that it
feared would impact negatively on its interests. Rather, it was
the specific target of the international community's effort to
create a new custom. Unfortunately, Professor Stein does not
offer a particular legal basis under which a dissenter may be
denied the benefits of the persistent objector merely because it
is the target of the custom in question. In fact, to deny access
to the rule for target states would seem to work counter to the
rule's function of smoothing the way for the development of
new custom. Professor Stein may be observing simply an inten-
sified version of the political pressure which acts to bind the
persistent objector-if a dissenting state will bow to pressure
from the majority, this pressure can only be magnified when
the dissenter is the very cause of the new custom in question.
172 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
173 Stein, supra note 14, at 479.
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3. An Objector Will be Bound to Rules of Jus Cogens
By far the most common circumstance under which the
persistent objector may be bound occurs when the custom in
question is based upon general principles of law, orjus cogens.
[B]road[ ] support exists for a... theory, according to which jus
cogens norms reflecting the fundamental interests of the interna-
tional community should bind all states without exception, notwith-
standing their possible dissent.""
The scope of "norms reflecting fundamental interests" is much
debated.175 Jus cogens, also called peremptory norms, has
been defined as
the body of those general rules of law whose non-observance may
affect the very essence of the legal system to which they belong to
such an extent that the subjects of law may not, under pain of abso-
lute nullity, depart from them in virtue of particular agree-
ments .... Thus, thejus cogens restricts the freedom of Parties; its
rules are absolutely binding.
7 6
This principle receives its strongest support from the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53,'" stat-
ing that "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law."7" A peremptory norm is defined as "a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permit-
ted .... "17 9 The principle was acknowledged by the ICJ in
the Nicaragua Case,"8 in which it characterized the prohibi-
74 GENNADII MIKHAIIvIcH DANEIENKO, LAW A1KING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
Co muiNrIy 219 (1993).
17 For an in-depth treatment ofjus cogens in international law, see, e.g., LAURI
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, HISTORI-
CAL DEVELOPMNT CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988); Ronald St. John MacDonald,
Fundamental Norms in Contemporary International Law, 25 CAN. Y.B. INfl. L
115 (1987).
11G HANNIKAINEN, supra note 175, at 1.
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature Mar. 12,
1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.TS. 331, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969).
178 Id.
179 Id.
" See supra note 111.
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tion on the use of force according to the UN Charter as "a
conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the
character ofjus cogens.""'
Jus cogens is also a moral principle, based in the essential
rules necessary to maintain human society.'82 It is from this
definition that some of the most commonly cited maxims ofjus
cogens spring:
(a) principles which establish the main sovereign rights of States
and peoples: equality and self-determinations [sic] of peoples, non-
interference;
(b) principles defending the peace and security of nations: prohibi-
tion of the use or threat of use of force, peaceful solution of dis-
putes... ;
(c) principles establishing major demands of humanity: ... ban on
genocide, apartheid and all other kinds of racial discrimination... ;
(d) principles prohibiting crimes against humanity, as established
in the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals ... ;
While there is significant dispute as to the existence of a hier-
archy of international law principles and the place of jus
cogens within such a hierarchy," the lists of many writers
resemble the one above."8 Whether the source of jus cogens
rests in a theory of positivism, natural law or general princi-
ple, the rules so categorized are considered basic to the essen-
tial functioning of the international system.
Thus, there can be no persistent objector derogating from
a rule of jus cogens. To allow such dissent would establish a
basic inequity between nations: Instead of an international
community rooted in a basic set of general principles, there
would arise smaller communities, differentiated by the privi-
leges granted by the exemption allowed by the Rule. Instead of
facilitating the creation of a cohesive international community,
the Rule would break that community apart.
... Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 16 (June 27).
" Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International
Law, 172 REc. DES CouRs 219, 260 (1981-II).
Id. at 262.
1 See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983).
'5 See, e.g., Alexidze, supra note 182, at 255; MacDonald, supra note 175, at
132.
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Of special note is Professor Charney's argument that the
concept of "universal" norms must expand to address pressing
issues which threaten the global environment. ' Threats
such as ozone depletion and ocean dumping endanger the
global environment and world population, demanding a set of
laws that establish global controls." Allowing dissent from
such regulations would permit the damage to continue and, in
the case of environmental regulation, would give an unfair
economic advantage to the dissenter. States complying with a
regulation would be forced to expend resources to change their
behavior, and a dissenter could continue to take advantage of
less costly, more damaging, environmental practices. This
problem is analogous to the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
The damage threatened by these weapons is global in scope,
and allowing some states to posses them while denying that
privilege to others grants an advantage in both political power
and national security which non-nuclear states must overcome
through more complex, collective security measures.
Even a single dissenter, Professor Charney argues, could
cause serious damage to the environment and the international
legal system because the dissenter would benefit from the
restraint of other states while remaining unrestrained itself. A
new norm of jus cogens should arise to protect environmental
interests when "the threat is grave, the international consen-
sus strong, and the consequences of exemptions severe.""s3
While the international legal system is not conducive to formu-
lating new norms with the urgency that Professor Charney
suggests is necessary, the argument that these new environ-
mental threats present a challenge to the stability of the inter-
national system as great as any violation of a currently rec-
ognized norm ofjus cogens remains convincing.
The nuclear objector will be subject to either of these
methods for binding a persistent objector to a customary rule,
either by demonstrating that the nuclear state is the particular
target of the rules acting to prohibit nuclear weapons or that
the questionable humanitarian customs are rooted in princi-
" Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INrL L. 529
(1993).
'n Id. at 542-43.
as Id. at 529.
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ples of jus cogens. However, it seems doubtful that nuclear
states will bow to world opinion on matters of such importance
to their national security."8 9 The nuclear states are politically
and economically strong enough to withstand organized con-
demnation that might be brought to bear. This leaves jus
cogens as the most likely means by which the nuclear objector
will be bound. Where the opinion of international community
might pressure an objector to cease an unpopular practice, a
finding that the use of nuclear weapons violates jus cogens is a
far more direct attack on the objector's position. Faced with
such a finding, the nuclear objector would be compelled to
either ignore the lawmaking process or be bound by it.
IV. CAN AN EXCLUSION TO THE RULE BE APPLIED TO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS?
The elements of the discussion above now resolve them-
selves into the question at the heart of this analysis: whether
the nuclear states may appeal to the Rule to shield themselves
from customs that prohibit the use, or threatened use, of nucle-
ar weapons? Put differently, do the customs through which
nuclear weapons have been prohibited create a basis upon
which the defense of the persistent objector may be denied to
the nuclear states? In light of the nature of the customs dis-
cussed, both fundamental principles of human rights and youn-
ger, emerging customs of environmental protection, the answer
must be yes: The customs that prohibit nuclear weapons are
fundamentally based in jus cogens and, therefore, the persis-
tent objector should not be a shield to their legal application to
bind the nuclear objector.
The case has been made that now, more than anytime in
history, there is a requirement for the emergence of universal
norms from which no state may be exempt, in order to defend
against an ever increasing class of global threats.19
' See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 182; see also supra notes 174-189 and accompanying text.
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A. Human Rights as Jus Cogens
It is unquestionable that certain customs have achieved
the level of jus cogens among certain rules regarding human
rights. Included among these are prohibitions against genocide,
slavery, torture, racial discrimination, and the "protection of
rights essential to the human person in times of peace and in
times of war." 9' Obviously this list ranges from concepts rea-
sonably well-understood, such as slavery, to those with less
clear boundaries. Certainly, the human rights protected byjus
cogens must go beyond the mere protection from being en-
slaved or summarily killed. It is in this expanded category of
human rights covered by jus cogens where the customs which
will be offended by the use of nuclear weapons can be found.
Support for the jus cogens nature of human rights during
times of war may be drawn from the language employed in
some of the oldest accepted treaties on human rights during
times of war. For instance, the St. Petersburg Declaration of
1907 states that "the progress of civilization should have the
effect of alleviating, as much as possible, the calamities of
war."'92 The evolutionary process of the jus in bello continues
today. Many current codifications refer to the importance of
safeguarding the lives and health of noncombatants, even after
all other mechanisms of international law have failed. Most
notable among these agreements are the additional protocols to
the 1949 Geneva Convention, which invoke the "principles of
humanity [and] dictates of public conscience" to govern actions
of combatants. 93 Again, in these protocols the right of a com-
batant to inflict injury on its opponent is limited, with express
prohibitions on the infliction of unnecessary suffering and
damage to the natural environment." Clearly, while the cus-
toms surrounding the laws of war continue to evolve, the basic
"" Roberto Ago, The Law of Treaties in Light of the Vienna Convention, 134
HAGUE RECUEIL 297, 324 n.37 (1971-rI).
"5 See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 98, at art. 1.
1" See supra note 100. Article 35 of Protocol I, entitled "Basic Rules,' explicitly
states that "it is prohibited to employ weapons of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering [and] it is prohibited to employ methods or means
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long
term and severe damage to the environment." Protocol 1, supra note 100, at art
35.
"L Protocol I, supra note 100.
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principles which inform them, a desire to contain war as far as
possible, remain rooted in jus cogens. Allowing even one com-
batant to exempt itself from these rules would pose a severe
threat to the peace and security of the international communi-
ty.
Strangely enough, the court refused to speak to the nature
of the human rights norms that would be violated by a threat
or use of nuclear weapons.195 This was despite the fact that
the court already acknowledged the fundamental nature of the
human rights norms involved. 9 ' Other judges of the court
were not so reserved, however, stating:
The rules of the humanitarian law of war have clearly acquired the
status of ius cogens [sic] for they are fundamental rules of a humani-
tarian character, from which no derogation is possible without ne-
gating the basic considerations of humanity which they are intended
to protect.
197
Judge Koroma also acknowledged the commentary of noted
publicists regarding the jus cogens nature of essential human
rights, and criticized the court for failing to take the additional
step of confirming the customary base of the human rights
obligations of the 1949 Geneva Convention:
A pronouncement of the Court emphasizing their humanitarian
underpinnings and the fact that they are deeply rooted in the tradi-
tions and values of member States of the international community
and deserve universal respect and protection, and not to be derogat-
ed from by States would assist in strengthening their legal obser-
vance especially in an era which has so often witnessed the most
19 The court stated:
The request addressed to the Court by the General Assembly raises the
question of the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian
law in cases of recourse to nuclear weapons, and the consequences of
that applicability for the legality of recourse to these weapons. It does
not raise the question of the character of the humanitarian law which
would apply to use of nuclear weapons.
Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 29.
1 See Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 28 ("[Tlhese fundamental rules [of
humanitarian law] are to be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible
principles of international customary law.").
1 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, supra note 104, at 58; see also
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, supra note 104, at 19.
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serious and egregious violation of humanitarian principles and rules
and whose very raison d'Mtre is irreconcilable with the use of nuclear
weapons."z '
Given these strong arguments, it seems clear that should the
question of the jus cogens nature of humanitarian law be
placed squarely before the court, as it would in the case of an
attempt to bind a nuclear objector to these customs, the court
would find in the affirmative.
B. Environmental Law as Jus Cogens
The fact that environmental protection as state obligation
is a relatively recent concern within global politics is a bar
neither to the finding of an emergent custom concerning it, nor
to a finding that recognized principles of environmental protec-
tion as human rights are grounded in jus cogens. Indeed, since
the court cleared the initial hurdle of recognizing customs
speaking to environmental protection, grounding for these
customs in jus cogens may be done absent the finding of con-
sistent practice which will form an element of the initial cus-
tom analysis. There are two ways by which the recent concern
over environmental protection may be translated into princi-
ples ofjus cogens.
First, principles of environmental protection may be
viewed as an extension of already existingjus cogens principles
of humanitarian law. That environmental protection is linked
to human rights is already implied by Protocol I. This posi-
tion has been strengthened by multilateral agreements such as
the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Techniques.' There-
fore, the court could find that a right to a clean environment is
an extension of existing human rights and, as such, is already
included in the customs ofjus in bello protecting human rights.
i" Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, supra note 104, at 18.
L" See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 120. Article I of the Convention reads, 'Each State party to
this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other ho3tile use of
environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party."
The Convention has been accepted by over 100 states, including the nuclear states.
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Second is the assertion that environmental protection
itself forms the basis for an extension of the fundamental obli-
gations of state practice. While proving the existence of a new
or extended custom is challenging, significant evidence already
exists pointing toward a growing feeling that environmental
protection is a human right crucial enough to give rise to its
own custom. 20' This new concern is voiced in agreements
ranging from general statements, such as the 1982 World
Charter for Nature,0 2 to agreements constructed to answer
very specific problems, such as the recent Protocol on Sub-
stances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,0 3 and the Montreal
Protocols.2 Ironically perhaps, this concern with safeguard-
ing the environment has been largely driven by the developed
states, including those nuclear states which would be bound by
this new custom. 25 A custom that began in a desire to curb
pollution caused by developing states in their haste to industri-
alize was found by the court to have a more far-reaching effect,
speaking not only to the right to develop, but the right to use
nuclear weapons as well.06
Either of these avenues of reasoning lead to the same
conclusion: Considering the fundamental nature of the customs
of environmental protection, these customs must be grounded
in the same jus cogens principles which inform other more
familiar rules of human rights. Alternatively, if environmental
protection is itself part of the basic obligations of humanitarian
law, it becomes jus cogens through the same means as those
201 For additional discussion of the environmental obligations of states, see su-
pra notes 128-136 and accompanying text.
2"2 Consideration and Adoption of the Revised Draft World Charter for Nature,
U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4, U.N. Sales No. 82-27864 (1982). In § 1, entitled "General Prin-
ciples," the Charter states in part: "Nature shall be respected and its essential
processes shall not be impaired [and] nature shall be secured against degradation
caused by warfare or other hostile activities."
2'3 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
204 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
20 For a discussion of the developed states' role in environmental regulation,
see, e.g., RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOiAcY (1991).
20" While the court did not find that obligations of environmental custom oper-
ated to specifically prohibit nuclear weapons, it did recognize that "the environ-
ment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a
catastrophe for the environment." Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, at 15.
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human rights rules. Again, allowing even one state to exempt
itself from these principles poses a threat to all and, therefore,
such objection should not be available to any state.
CONCLUSION
When principles of human and environmental rights
threatened by nuclear weapons are grounded in jus cogens, it
becomes apparent that the persistent objector should not be an
available route to the nuclear states in any legal defense.
Threats posed by these weapons are too great to permit them
to be merely curbed by non-proliferation regimes, or piecemeal
nuclear-free zones. The policy goals of the Persistent Objector
Rule are thus foiled: Allowing a nuclear state to exempt itself
from the custom to encourage participation in the international
political community would threaten or destroy the very cus-
toms that are of vital importance to that community. The ex-
ception swallows the rule.
Other means of binding the persistent objector will not
function to bind the nuclear states due to the distribution of
power peculiar to nuclear issues. The same external pressure
which caused the persistent objections of South Africa or Ja-
pan to fail could not be brought to bear upon the nuclear
states. These states, themselves great powers within the inter-
national community, cannot be cut off from the global commu-
nity as South Africa was isolated. Nor will they conform their
practice to those of their neighbors (as Japan and the United
States did regarding their claims to their coastal jurisdiction)
where a device that is viewed as vital to national security is
concerned. The failure of international pressure to halt French
nuclear testing in the South Pacific is a prime example of the
relative impunity with which an already established nuclear
state may act. This is not to say that nuclear weapons may be
used with impunity, but so long as the possible use of these
weapons remains a pillar of defense policy, the vital legal
norms discussed above remain threatened.'o Therefore, the
moral force created by a norm of jus cogens should alone bind
2" In other words, a threat to commit an illegal act is, in itself, an illegal act.
The case for prohibiting the mere threat of use is presented in Weiss et al, supra
note 95, at 45.
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the persistent objector. In the end, the choice of the nuclear
state will be a moral one-to be bound by the recognition of
the international community of a threat to all, or to use their
unique position as political and economically powerful actors to
exempt themselves from the international process when it
suits their purposes. That these states have such power, and
have used it in the past, is unquestionable. The question now
becomes whether the exercise of such power now-in an in-
creasingly interdependent world, on a subject of such global
importance-will damage the international legal processes
upon which all nations depend.
Adam Steinfeld
